The petitioner
approached the Rajasthan High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India, challenging an order dated March 19, 2026, passed by the Additional
District Judge, Makrana, which permitted the respondent-plaintiff to amend the
plaint under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908. The original suit had been instituted seeking specific
performance of an agreement dated April 17, 2019, under which the
respondent-plaintiff had agreed to supply mineral stone to the
petitioner-defendant at a mutually settled rate. The plaintiff alleged that
despite execution of the agreement and payment of an advance amount, the agreed
quantity of mineral stone had not been supplied. Accordingly, the suit sought
specific performance of the agreement and a permanent injunction restraining
the defendant from supplying the mineral stone to any other person. The
original plaint specifically mentioned that an advance amount of ₹1,19,74,254
had been paid and remained due.
After the written
statement had been filed and issues framed, the suit reached the stage of the
plaintiff's evidence. At that stage, the respondent-plaintiff filed an
application seeking amendment of the plaint to incorporate an alternative
prayer for recovery or refund of the advance amount in the event that specific
performance was refused. The petitioner opposed the application, arguing that
the amendment was belated and did not satisfy the due-diligence requirement
under the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC. It was further contended that
introducing a monetary recovery claim would alter the nature and character of
the suit. The Trial Court, however, allowed the amendment, relying on Section
22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Aggrieved by this decision, the petitioner
approached the Rajasthan High Court, contending that the Trial Court had erred
in permitting the amendment after commencement of the trial.
ISSUES:
Whether a plaintiff
seeking specific performance could amend the plaint at the stage of evidence to
incorporate an alternative relief for refund or recovery of earnest money or an
advance amount under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, notwithstanding
the due-diligence requirement under the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC. The
Court also considered whether the proposed amendment altered the nature and
character of the original suit and whether the Trial Court's decision suffered
from any illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error warranting interference
under Article 227 of the Constitution.
JUDGEMENT WITH REASONING:
The Rajasthan High
Court dismissed the writ petition and upheld the Trial Court's order permitting
amendment of the plaint. It held that Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act,
1963, contains a non-obstante clause and expressly permits the incorporation of
a claim for refund of earnest money or an advance amount at any stage of the
proceedings when specific performance is refused. Consequently, the
due-diligence requirement under the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC did not
operate as a bar to the proposed amendment. The Court found that the amendment
arose from facts already pleaded in the original plaint and did not introduce a
new cause of action. It further held that no perversity, manifest illegality or
jurisdictional error had been established to justify interference with the
Trial Court's order under Article 227 of the Constitution.
The High Court
emphasised that Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, specifically
enables a plaintiff seeking specific performance to claim alternative relief,
including the refund of earnest money or a deposit, if the claim for specific
performance is refused. The provision contains a non-obstante clause giving it
overriding effect over the general procedural provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Since the Specific Relief Act is a special enactment and the CPC is
a general procedural law, the Court held that the specific statutory provision
would prevail where the two provisions were inconsistent. Consequently, the
restriction under the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC, which ordinarily
requires a party seeking amendment after commencement of trial to demonstrate
that the matter could not have been raised earlier despite due diligence, could
not independently prevent an amendment falling within Section 22. The Court
relied particularly on the Supreme Court's decision in K.R. Suresh v. R.
Poornima & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1014, which recognised the overriding
effect of Section 22 and interpreted the expression permitting amendment at any
stage as requiring courts to allow amendments incorporating the relief
contemplated by the provision. It also considered LIC v. Sanjeev Builders
Private Limited & Anr. and the Karnataka High Court's decision in Shri
Mohammadrafi & Ors. v. Bandenawz & Ors., which emphasised the
importance of resolving the real controversy between parties and avoiding
multiplicity of proceedings.
The Court further
found that the proposed amendment did not fundamentally change the nature or
character of the suit because the original plaint already contained specific
averments regarding payment of ₹1,19,74,254 as an advance and its continued
non-refund. The amendment merely sought to incorporate an alternative monetary
relief arising from the same transaction, to be pursued if specific performance
could not be granted. Permitting the amendment would therefore enable the court
to determine the entire controversy between the parties without compelling the
plaintiff to institute separate proceedings for recovery of the advance amount.
The Court concluded that rejecting the amendment solely because the trial had
commenced would defeat the purpose of Section 22 and the objective of
procedural law to minimise litigation. Finally, applying the principles
governing the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, it
observed that interference with an order of a subordinate court is warranted
only in cases involving patent perversity, manifest illegality, jurisdictional
infirmity or grave injustice. Since the petitioner had failed to establish any
such ground, the Trial Court's decision was upheld and the writ petition
dismissed.
ANALYSIS:
The Rajasthan High
Court held that Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, enables a
plaintiff seeking specific performance to incorporate an alternative prayer for
refund of earnest money or an advance amount, even after the commencement of
trial. The provision’s non-obstante clause gives it overriding effect over
inconsistent general procedural requirements under the Code of Civil Procedure,
including the due-diligence requirement under the proviso to Order VI Rule 17
CPC. Relying particularly on the Supreme Court’s decision in K.R. Suresh v. R.
Poornima & Ors., the Court emphasised that an amendment seeking the
alternative relief contemplated under Section 22 cannot be rejected merely
because the trial has commenced. The purpose of the provision is to enable the
court to grant appropriate alternative relief where specific performance is
refused, thereby avoiding unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings.
The Court also found
that the proposed amendment did not change the nature or character of the
original suit, since the plaint already contained averments concerning the
payment of ₹1,19,74,254 as an advance and its continued non-refund. The
amendment merely sought an alternative monetary remedy arising from the same
transaction, allowing the court to resolve the entire dispute in a single
proceeding. The Court further reiterated that its supervisory jurisdiction
under Article 227 is limited and does not permit interference with a
subordinate court’s order unless there is perversity, manifest illegality,
jurisdictional error or grave injustice. As the petitioner failed to establish
any such ground, the High Court found no reason to interfere with the Trial
Court’s decision and dismissed the petition.