ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT: CONFESSION TO POLICE IN CUSTODY INADMISSIBLE EVEN BEFORE FIR REGISTRATION:

The Allahabad High Court has ruled that an extrajudicial confession made by a person in police custody is inadmissible in evidence even if it occurs before the formal registration of an FIR. A Division Bench comprising Justice J.J. Munir and Justice Vinai Kumar Dwivedi clarified the distinction between Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act. The Court explained that Section 25 bars confessions made directly to a police officer, while Section 26 imposes a broader restriction on confessions made by anyone in police custody, regardless of whether the statement is directed to a police officer or another person. This prohibition applies even when the individual is not yet formally an accused or named in an FIR but is detained as a suspect for inquiry or before a crime is officially recorded. Such a confession remains inadmissible unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate.

The case arose from a double murder in which a husband and wife, the appellants, were convicted by the trial court under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment. The prosecution alleged that the deceased, a 28-year-old male tenant in their house, had an illicit relationship with their 15-year-old daughter, resulting in her pregnancy. An ultrasound conducted on the day before the incident confirmed the minor girl was approximately 25 weeks pregnant. On the intervening night, both the tenant and the girl were found dead in a room within the appellants' premises, with postmortem reports attributing the deaths to ante-mortem strangulation leading to asphyxia.

The prosecution's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including motive stemming from the pregnancy discovery, telephonic conversations the previous night showing the deceased in a frightened state, medical evidence confirming homicidal strangulation, and an alleged extrajudicial confession by one of the appellants. Witnesses claimed that upon arriving at the scene, the appellant confessed to the murders in the presence of others. However, evidence indicated that by that time, the appellant had already been apprehended and was under police control, though the FIR was lodged later that day.

The High Court first addressed whether the deaths were homicidal or suicidal. It relied on medical evidence and established jurisprudence, noting that strangulation is typically homicidal and that suicidal strangulation is rare, usually requiring a device to sustain pressure post-unconsciousness. No such mechanism was present at the scene, leading the Court to conclude the deaths were homicidal and occurred inside the appellants' premises. This shifted the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act onto the appellants to explain how the deaths happened in their special knowledge. Their alibi was deemed unconvincing, and their failure to provide a satisfactory explanation formed a vital link in the chain of circumstantial evidence.

On the confession issue, the State argued that since no FIR had been registered at the time, only Section 25 applied and did not bar the statement. The Court rejected this, holding that Section 26's wider embargo governed confessions in custody, irrespective of formal accusation or FIR timing. The alleged confession, made while the appellant was under police control, was therefore inadmissible.

After evaluating the entire evidence, the Court found the prosecution had established an unbroken chain of circumstances pointing solely to the appellants' guilt. It upheld the convictions under Section 302/34 IPC, deeming life imprisonment the appropriate minimum sentence given the facts. Both criminal appeals were dismissed. The appellant on bail was directed to surrender within two weeks, failing which the concerned Chief Judicial Magistrate was to secure her custody and commit her to prison. Her bail bonds were cancelled and sureties discharged. The Court also instructed communication of the order to the appellant in custody via the Jail Superintendent and forwarding of the judgment with lower court records to the trial court for compliance.